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Abstract 
In the field of medical virtue ethics, the concept of ‘phronesis’ (or practical wisdom) 
plays a crucial role. Indeed in medical ethics, the good ethical judgement of the 
medical practitioner is of such importance that Pellegrino and Thomasma (1994) 
have called phronesis ‘medicine’s indispensable virtue’. In recent years there has 
been a flurry of interest in phronesis in medicine and a number of important 
theoretical questions have been identified regarding phronesis: (1) is phronesis more 
akin to thinking or theorising or to feeling and intuiting?, (2) can phronesis be 
communicated and explained or is it individual and personal? and (3) is phronesis 
needed in all decision-making in medicine or only in the making of decisions that are 
ethically fraught? In this paper we argue that, while these questions have received 
attention on the theoretical level, empirical investigation has the potential to shed 
light on these questions from the perspective of medical practice in the real world. 
Indeed, because virtue ethics insists that virtuous action can only be understood 
properly in the context of real decisions (and not in the abstract) there are good 
grounds for thinking that understanding phronesis must involve attention to real 
world particulars. In particular, we hold that empirical investigation of phronesis will 
have to involve in-depth narrative interviewing and analysis along with an arts based 
approach to presentation of findings. 
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1. Introduction 
In medical ethics, a large body of work exists on the virtues that enable good medical 
practice. Medical virtue ethics singles out a number of virtues of the good doctor for 
attention; amongst others, these include empathy (Batt-Rawden, 2013), care (Leffel 
et al., 2014), truthfulness (Jackson, 2001, 2002) and justice (Carel and Kidd, 2014). 
According to medical ethicists like Pellegrino and Thomasma, however, phronesis 
(or ‘practical wisdom’) ‘occupies a special place’ among these virtues. (1993: 83) For 
Pellegrino and Thomasma, phronesis is ‘indispensable’ to good medical practice 
because it coordinates all the different moral virtues that the doctor must bring to 
ethical decisions as part of wise moral action. This paper outlines the background to 
a current dispute about how moral judgements are made and how this disagreement 
shapes professional education and development. It is argued that empirical work is 
necessary to inform the required normative debate and that a particular narrative 
method is the best way to do this. 
 
2. From rules to phronesis 
The most ethically challenging decisions in medicine are often cases in which there 
are multiple conflicting moral and medical goals that the doctor feels bound to 
pursue. In many troubling cases in medical ethics, the clinician must, for instance, 
weigh up the different goods that they can pursue for the patient – should they seek 
to prolong life or ease pain in the palliative care setting, for example. On occasion, 
the good for a particular patient must also be weighed up against the good for others 
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– for instance, who, out of a range of suitable patients, should benefit from an organ 
transplant when only one organ is available. Furthermore, even when it is clear what 
good to pursue, there are often multiple ways in which this good can be promoted – 
is it best, for instance, to prescribe a drug, advise on nutrition or, in extremis 
advocate surgery, when faced with co-morbid conditions like overweight, high blood-
pressure, high cholesterol, etc.  
 
When faced with such uncertainty, the response of many policy makers, 
administrators and even clinicians is to reach for the rule-book – that is, to make ever 
more intricate guidelines, protocols and procedures to determine what clinicians 
must do in morally fraught situations. Upshur (2014), for instance, documents the 
growth of clinical practice guidelines over the last 25 years (he notes that 73 clinical 
guidelines could be found in PubMed in 1990 and 7,508 in 2012). However, in the 
face of this tide of ever-closer codification of good medical practice, many clinicians 
bemoan the loss of their professional autonomy. Greenhalgh and others (2012), for 
instance, document practitioners’ resistance to (and, practically speaking, sabotage) 
of one system1 that attempted to codify and constrain physicians’ decisions. The 
paradox involved in real clinicians’ experience of the rules, guidelines, protocols, etc. 
that today govern clinical practice is this: whilst these rule-based mechanisms are 
supposed to bring clarity, accuracy and consistency to clinical judgements and make 
it easy to know what to do, doctors themselves experience the growth of rules, 
guidelines and procedures as alienating, confusing and even demeaning. 
 
1 The UK National Health Service’s ‘Choose and Book’ out-patient referral system. 
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The basic struggle between rule-based governance of clinical decision-making and 
clinical judgement is played out in a series of different contests. Often, the struggle is 
portrayed as one between evidence-based medicine (EBM) or, more broadly, 
scientific or rationalistic approaches to medicine and approaches that are more 
‘humanistic’ and stress the role of tacit knowledge, clinical experience, professional 
judgement and even ‘intuition’ (Braude, 2012) in clinical decision-making. 
Sometimes, the struggle is over the relative power given to individual practitioners 
over and against administrators or over patients’ expectations that they be treated as 
persons, not conditions. Moving to the realm of medical ethics, specifically, there is a 
strong current of thought (associated with virtue ethical thinking, but also with 
contextualist or particularist approaches) that suggest that ethical decisions simply 
cannot be made in a general fashion, but need to be made on a patient-by-patient 
basis. As Tyreman puts it: 
 
‘A rule-governed decision-making process fails at the crucial point where 
there is conflict over competing goods or which rules apply… It assumes 
that there is a right (and wrong) answer rather than a range of 
possibilities. The best doctor will…identify what is good and best for this 
patient.’ (Tyreman, 2000: 121) 
 
But how does the clinician identify what is good for the particular patient accurately 
and how do they bring about this good as best as possible through intervention? 
Clinicians reach for a number of concepts to explain what exactly this ability is that 
the good clinician is supposed to have to understand the good for the patient and 
how to bring it about. These include ‘clinical judgement’, ‘experience’, ‘tacit 
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knowledge’ and ‘professionalism’, but all of these concepts in turn need to be defined 
and unpacked. In medical ethics and the philosophy of medicine, one concept in 
particular is increasingly reached for to explain what it is that the expert clinician 
knows or can do in advancing the individual good for the individual patient – 
‘phronesis’ or ‘practical wisdom’. Starting with the work of Jonsen and Toulmin 
(1988) and much influenced by Pellegrino and Thomasma (1993), a number of 
scholars have built their conceptions of what good ethical judgement in medicine is 
on the concept of phronesis (e.g. Montgomery, 2006; Kaldjian, 2010 and 2014; and 
Toon, 2014). However, this approach has also been around long enough to generate 
a critical scholarship. Braude (2012) has argued that phronesis in medicine needs to 
be supplemented by intuition (‘nous’ in Aristotelian thinking). Waring (2000) and 
Hoffman (2003) hold that Aristotle himself saw medical knowledge as craft or 
technical knowledge (‘techne’) and not as a form of wise general ethical deliberation 
(‘phronesis’). Kristjansson (2015: 305 - 307) holds that, arguably, contemporary 
medical virtue ethics is more informed by MacIntyre’s view of phronesis than 
Aristotle’s. He points out that ‘MacIntyre’s notion is wider than Aristotle’s in 
incorporating paradigmatic examples of what Aristotle would specify as techne…’ 
(2015: 305) What is at stake between more Aristotelian and more MacIntyrean 
approaches to phronesis is whether we can distinguish between technical and 
ethical aspects of the practice of medicine (as Aristotle seems to have held) or to 
hold, with MacIntyre, that all technical decisions within a practice (like medicine) 
already has an ethical dimension.   
 
3. Phronesis in Medical Ethics: from Aristotle to Pellegrino 
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In Aristotle’s system of ethics, the moral virtues like honesty, kindness, justice, 
courage, etc., do not by themselves prepare the moral actor for moral action. 
According to Aristotle, while the moral virtues ensure that we aim at the correct goal 
in moral action, it requires a form of practical moral know-how to bring those goals 
about. This is phronesis. For Aristotle, phronesis is wisdom in the domain of praxis 
(that is practical moral action) rather than in the domain of episteme (or science). 
Phronesis fulfils two cardinal roles in Aristotle’s virtue ethics. Firstly, it completes the 
moral virtues in that it provides the practical know-how needed to turn virtue into 
successful action (this is the constitutive role of phronesis). Secondly, it enables the 
moral actor to weigh up the importance of the competing goals that they themselves 
(or others) may have in any moral situation (the integrative role of phronesis) 
(Kristjansson, 2015: 303).  
 
One of the biggest problems in understanding phronesis in Aristotle is becoming 
clear on whether it is an essentially theoretical or intellectual ability (an ability to think 
well) or a practical moral ability (an ability to do the right thing). On the one hand, 
Aristotle quite clearly asserts that phronesis is an intellectual virtue and not a moral 
virtue; on the other, Aristotle holds that phronesis is practical, rather than scientific 
wisdom. In the debate between broadly scientific and humanistic perspectives on 
medicine, it appears that Aristotle takes no clear side.  
 
 
As Russell (2012) explains the answer is most likely to be ‘a bit of both’. Phronesis in 
Aristotle has four dimensions. Firstly, phronesis has to do with having 
‘comprehension’ (sunesis or eusunesis): this is the ability to recognize the morally 
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important features of a situation and to assess what is important to achieve in such a 
situation. Secondly, phronesis requires good sense (gnome): this is an ability to be 
reasonable and to see a matter from a number of points of view. Thirdly, phronesis 
requires a form of intelligence or a form of quick and overall grasp of the situation 
that one finds oneself in and of what is to be done in that situation. According to 
Russell, while Aristotle describes this constituent part of phronesis as nous and while 
nous is more often associated with scientific than with moral knowledge, as a form of 
intelligence nous is present in both good theoretical discovery and in good practical 
deliberation. Indeed, Braude (2012) makes his case for intuition in medicine in much 
the same terms. Fourthly, for Russell, phronesis requires the cleverness (deinotes) 
needed to plan and execute an effective moral course of action.  
 
For Aristotle, phronesis is not only being able to plan or being able to reason in a 
means/end fashion – it requires seeing situations in a morally intelligent and 
perceptive way (Russell, 2012: 20 – 24). The best way to explain what this ‘morally 
intelligent’ seeing is, is by asking what kind of activity the phronimos (the person with 
phronesis) engages. The activity of which phronesis is the excellence is practical 
ethical deliberation. While this form of deliberation is a deeply intellectual activity, it 
must not be confused with theoretical or scientific reasoning. A contemporary way of 
making clear the difference is to say that, while scientific reasoning is descriptive – in 
that it aims to describe ‘how the world is’ – moral deliberation is normative in that it 
attempts to settle ‘how the world of human actions or affairs should be’. Rather than 
descriptive (scientific) reasoning, phronesis is a form of practical normative 
reasoning. 
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 Applying the concept ‘phronesis’ to medical ethics, Pellegrino and Thomasma hold 
that medicine tends to see ‘clinical judgement’ mainly as an intellectual matter in the 
first sense – that is reaching the right scientific conclusions based on the evidence 
available. While not drawing the distinction between scientific and normative thinking 
as boldly as Russell, they hold that, because the doctor must seek what is good for 
the individual patient (a matter not settled by science alone), clinical decisions 
involve an ‘integration of scientific and moral reasoning and judgement’ found in 
phronesis.2 (Pellegrino and Thomasma, 1993: 90) Kaldjian goes further and 
suggests that all clinical decision making is a form of phronesis. Firstly, both clinical 
decision making and phronesis must involve selection of the good for the patient; 
secondly, the elements of clinical judgement (understanding the mechanism of the 
problem, understanding the means available to address it and understanding the 
priorities of the patient) appear very much like the elements of wise decisions; and 
thirdly, both phronesis and clinical judgement are learned over time in practice-based 
communities (and not as pure theory or principles).3 (Kaldjian, 2010: 560 – 1) This 
matter – whether all clinical judgement involves phronesis or whether only those 
cases in which there are distinctively ethical considerations in play involve phronesis 
– presents the interesting problem of understanding whether all (or only some) 
medical problems are essentially ethical. 
 
2 It is important to point out that this integration only makes sense on the assumption that medicine 
has a particular end goal or telos. The goal of science, one may reasonably suppose, is knowledge, 
but, as Pellegrino and Thomasma (1993: 52) explain, the telos of medicine is the restoration and 
promotion of health. This, too, is an important difference between science and medicine – they aim at 
different things. We thank an anonymous reviewer. 
3 For more on the importance of communal story-telling, see section 7. 
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Kaldjian’s (2014) view is much influenced by MacIntyre. In his recaptiluation of virtue 
ethics in After Virtue, MacIntyre sketches an account of meaningful human activities 
in terms of ‘social practices’. For MacIntyre, a ‘practice’ is ‘any coherent and complex 
form of socially established co-operative human activity’ (1981: 187) and in the 
literature on professional ethics, MacIntyre’s ‘practice’ view has proven very 
influential. For MacIntyre, social practices – like, for instance, practicing law, 
architecture or medicine – are individuated by their ‘telos’ or goal.4 For MacIntyre, 
this telos is agreed and explored socially and is not fixed for all time (Knights and 
O’Leary (2006: 15); moreover, MacIntyre holds that in order to pursue this goal, 
characteristic sets of virtues are agreed within the practice that constitute agreed 
‘good practice’. Translating this view to medicine, one may say that, for MacIntyre, 
the whole of the practice of medicine would be ‘ethical’ in the sense that what counts 
as good medical practice is determined in terms of the virtues that are agreed by the 
community of medical doctors as being good practice. For those who see medical 
virtue ethics through a MacIntyrean lens, the community of practitioners of medicine 
is important in settling what counts as good practice; moreover, they stress that good 
practice can only be learned in a community.5  
 
4. Studying phronesis 
While they all stress the importance of practical wisdom in the practice of medicine, 
none of the authors listed above explore the actual psychology and manifestation of 
phronesis in real doctors’ decision-making. Critical scholarship regarding phronesis 
has tended to answer questions about the nature of phronesis from the armchair; 
4 In the context of medicine, we can readily agree with Pellegrino and Thomasma, that the telos of 
medicine is ‘health’. 
 
5 See section 6 on studying phronesis narratively for more on the importance of community. 
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that is, it has relied on well-known examples and on reasoning from these examples 
to characterise phronesis. However, many of these theoretical questions about 
phronesis can also be asked empirically. The question is: what does phronetic 
decision-making feel like or seem like to real expert practitioners of medicine when 
they look at wise decisions made over a whole career of practicing medicine – either 
by themselves or by others?  
 
• Does phronesis seem to them more like a form of thinking, theorising or 
deliberating that is like scientific thinking?  
• Or does it seem more like making intuitive or emotional judgements (the flash 
of insight)?  
• Is phronesis something that can be captured in words or otherwise 
communicated in their experience?  
• Or can it only be grasped by the individual in a moment of insight?  
• Is the moral dimension of phronesis always in play when one practices 
medicine?  
• Or does it only activate in those instances when something distinctly ethical is 
at stake?  
 
Asking real medical practitioners what phronesis feels like ‘from the inside’ (or asking 
whether they recognise the concept at all) is not to reduce the philosophical and 
conceptual matter of what phronesis is to psychology. Rather, it is to hold that 
theorising needs to be tested for consistency against real experience. It is also to 
hold that real experience can generate intuitions that inform theorising. In medical 
ethics, there is today much greater acceptance of theorising that is empirically 
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informed (Christen et al., 2014) and in the field of medical virtue ethics the benefits of 
describing real cases and experience are particularly attractive as virtue ethics 
insists on the importance of the features of the particular case in deciding what is the 
right thing to do. 
 
Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, the reason why one might want to study 
phronesis in medicine is not only to understand it, but also to promote it – that is to 
help medical students and young doctors to become more practically wise or to 
create the kinds of medical institutions that will allow and promote wise practice. One 
cannot design a medical system that allows and promotes phronesis if one does not 
know (empirically) how the current system may promote or smother its development 
or if one does not know (empirically) how to bring about the desirable change one 
wishes to see. Neither can one teach a student or medical practitioner how to be 
practically wise if one does not know (empirically) what characterises their decision-
making at present or if one does not (empirically) know what is the most effective 
way for a person to develop phronesis.   
 
Putting flesh on the bones of empirically informed bioethical discussion of phronesis 
is, however, very hard. While many medical and bioethicists advocate for the 
importance of the development of phronesis in medical education and practice (see 
the impressive list above), the actual acquisition and development of phronesis has 
been little studied in medicine.  
 
This leaves the field in somewhat of a bind, for the main rival to a phronetic approach 
to medical decision-making – the rule-based (usually deontological) approach to 
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ethical medical decision-making – has available a very well-established and powerful 
body of methods to measure the growth (or not, as the case may be) of logical and 
rational reasoning about ethical dilemmas in medicine. A useful way to see the 
terrain is as follows. On a rule-based way of thinking about the nature of moral 
decision-making in medicine, what is the right way to make an ethical decision is 
something that can be captured in codified rules, principles or guidelines. Moreover, 
what is needed for individual clinicians in order to do the right thing is for them to 
know and understand the rule in question and to be able to apply that rule in a 
particular context. How clinicians understand and reason about principles in 
medicine is a matter that has been studied very extensively. Scholars who study the 
moral development of medical students and doctors from what is called a ‘cognitive’ 
perspective draw on moral judgement tests in the tradition of Kohlberg (1981; 1982) 
in studying the sophistication of doctors’ thinking about moral problems. A large body 
of work exists on the use of such moral judgement tests in medicine (Baldwin and 
Self, 2005, Bebeau, 2006) and this is not matched by psychological work on the 
development of moral virtue in medicine. (Kotzee and Ignatowicz, 2015)  
 
According to Kohlberg (1981; 1984) moral development from childhood into 
adulthood takes place through the gradual unfolding of different modes of moral 
thinking. For Kohlberg, the young child tends to think in terms of self-interest (pre-
conventional thinking) and progresses in later childhood and early adolescence to 
thinking of right action in terms of what is socially desirable (conventional thinking). 
Eventually, the adult is able to transcend conventional thinking and become capable 
of independent thought about moral principles (post-conventional thinking). 
Compared to virtue approaches to ethics, the cognitive approach associated with 
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Kohlberg’s work studies mostly patterns of thinking and a number of cognitive 
psychological instruments (like the Moral Judgement Interview or MJI and the 
Defining Issues Test or DIT) are much used to study moral thinking in medicine. 
Together, tens, if not hundreds of studies have used these instruments to study 
moral development in medical students and doctors. One great advantage that rule-
based (often, specifically deontological) approaches to medical decision making 
have over virtue based approaches, then, is that there exists a considerable body of 
psychological scholarship on the main concepts in moral reasoning. By contrast, 
psychological study of the virtues in medicine is in its infancy. (Kotzee and 
Ignatowicz, 2015)6 
 
What is the case for the moral virtues generally, is also the case for phronesis. 
Admittedly, there is a developing study of wisdom in psychology with a number of 
different wisdom scales entering use. Glück et al. (2013), for instance, survey 
psychometric measurements of wisdom and highlight the psychological measures of 
wisdom that are already in common use. As Glück et al. point out, however, there is 
no agreed definition of wisdom in psychology and all four of the most prominent 
measures measure wisdom constructs that are far removed from what Aristotle 
would call ‘phronesis’. As Glück et al. make clear, most wisdom research in 
psychology focuses on exploring ‘personal wisdom’ (that is the insight a person has 
gained about their own life and experiences) or ‘general wisdom’ (that is insight a 
person has gained into the human condition generally). While no doubt an admirable 
trait in any person, there is no obvious practical link between personal or general 
wisdom in this sense and what researchers in medical ethics would be especially 
6 Although, see section 7 below. 
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interested in – the ability to make good clinical judgements or wise decisions on 
behalf of patients. It therefore looks highly doubtful that the measures of wisdom that 
already exist in psychology can simply be adapted for research on doctors’ ethical 
decision-making.  
5. The challenge of studying phronesis 
The central challenge in the area is how we are to study phronesis while doing 
justice to the complexity of the concept. According to Kristjansson (2015) phronesis 
is generally understood to be the wisdom to judge the right action to be performed in 
a particular situation when different goals would call for different actions. Thus, by its 
very nature phronesis cannot be reduced to rules for action, or an algorithm for 
decision-making. This has led scholars like Hursthouse (1999) to suggest that 
phronesis is uncodifiable. Indeed, Irwin (2000) explains that Aristotle himself saw the 
study of virtue as an ‘inexact science’. This does not mean that virtue is a completely 
subjective matter that cannot be studied; it is only to say that the extent to which a 
course of action is ‘virtuous’ is a complicated matter that requires much detailed 
knowledge and careful judgement of people, and the situations in which they act. As 
Curren and Kotzee (2014: 9) argue, the complexity involved in judging the character 
of a real person can be like the complexity involved in understanding a character in a 
novel; sometimes the amount of subtle information one needs to judge someone’s 
virtues is much closer to reading and reflecting upon a rich book (or ‘story’) than to 
noting a few numbers on a standardised test.  
 
For this reason, theoretically informed bioethical study of phronesis is much more 
likely to draw on qualitative approaches – and specifically in-depth narrative research 
– than quantitative psychometric approaches. As Zagzebski points out, people often 
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learn about virtue through first hand, narrative accounts of other people’s actions 
which are thought of as virtuous (Zagzebski, 2013: 7-8). Put simply, people 
understand what it is to be, say, honest, in terms of the examples of persons that 
they, and others, regard as honest. Furthermore, people often communicate about 
what it is for a person to be virtuous narratively – that is by telling stories about 
people (real or fictional) – and how they have been or have not been virtuous. As 
MacIntyre puts it: ‘generally, a stance on the virtues will be to adopt a stance on the 
narrative character of human life.’ (1981: 144) There is little reason to think that this 
would be any different when it comes to phronesis; in fact, Aristotle sees the 
development of phronesis mainly as a matter of emulating and being taught by 
people who are themselves practically wise, and who tell stories about being wise. 
 
Within the social sciences more broadly, narrative or storytelling approaches are 
important for the same reasons. As Hardy noted, ‘narratives are integral to social 
life’ (Hardy, 1975) such that stories are not just sets of facts, but like Zagzebski’s 
exemplar narratives, stories are ‘organising devices through which we interpret and 
constitute the world’ (Lawler, 2008). Stories are a social and cultural resource that 
people use to make sense of their lives and others (Lawler, 2008), and one aspect 
of their lives and culture is morality and the associated moral education that builds 
morality.  
 
Just as Zagzebski views narratives about exemplars’ traits and actions as integral to 
moral education, so too do social science accounts of narratives link stories with 
learning right and wrong. Life stories, the factual stories we tell each other about 
each other, contain within them rules that adhere to what Lawler calls ‘intelligibility 
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norms’, norms that our local in time and space to our culture, and which contribute 
to our understanding of morality within our own community and culture (Lawler, 
2008).  
 
This approach to understanding virtues through storytelling and stories about 
exemplars not only reflects the different contexts in which people learn to make 
decisions, but allows the identification of these exemplars to be revisable should 
context or circumstance change (Zagzebski, 2013: 8). This type of flexibility allows 
virtues, and by extension phronesis, to be open to the outcomes of moral debate 
within and across practices and communities. Narrative studies are embedded in the 
hermeneutic tradition, focusing on the investigation of meaning and interpretation. 
According to this view, the importance of a story is not what happened in the story, 
but like a parable, what the significance of the story is to the teller, the listener and 
the culture within which the story is told (Lawler, 2008). Narratives about exemplars 
are especially significant as they promote moral education through stories about 
exemplars.  
  
A qualitative approach that values lived experiences and the first-hand accounts of 
these experiences through story-telling is what is needed to fully understand the 
extent to which phronesis plays a role in moral development in medicine. This 
approach has already been used with some success in nursing studies examining 
phronesis in practice (Danbjorg and Birklund, 2011; Sorensen, 2012; Phillips and 
Hall, 2013; Eriksen et al., 2014; Farrington et al., 2015). The time is ripe to conduct 
similar studies in medicine and see what light empirical investigation can shed on 
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the theoretical puzzles that still exist regarding the nature of medicine’s 
‘indispensable virtue’ phronesis. 
 
6. Narrative tools for studying phronesis 
Above, we held that the study of virtue in medicine is ‘in its infancy’ compared with 
the study of moral reasoning. As we have seen, however, narratives (that can be the 
stories doctors and other health professionals tell in order to inform, to teach or 
simply to converse) do provide a vehicle to communicate what it is about a specific 
decision in medicine that makes it wise or unwise. In truth, such narratives have 
always been told in medical communities – it may just be that these narratives have 
not been recognised as what they are: an evidence-base that illustrates what virtue 
in medicine amounts to.7 No author has done more to advocate for the narrative turn 
in researching medical decision-making than Montgomery (1991 and 2006). In fact, 
Montgomery terms the specific character of rationality in medicine ‘phronesiology’ 
(2006: 125); investigating decision-making in medicine, for Montgomery, is a matter 
of studying the extent to which  such decisions count as practically wise. To illustrate 
how a narrative can serve to illustrate the phronetic character of good decisions in 
medicine, consider this case. 
 
Jerome Groopman describes the case of a patient, called Alex, a physicist.8  
Alex was diagnosed with life-threatening anemia and recommended a 
bone-marrow transplant by his own doctor, but approached Groopman for 
a second opinion. Groopman reviewed Alex’s bone marrow biopsy and, 
while he recognised that Alex was suffering marrow failure, he did not 
agree with Alex’s doctor that this was due to myelodysplasia or aplastic 
anemia. In particular, he did not agree with the primary doctor’s suggested 
7 We thank an anonymous reviewer for impressing this point on us.  
8 The case is recounted in much depth in Groopman (2000). It is mentioned by Montgomery (2006: 
128).  
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treatment – an unmatched bone-marrow transplant (a matched donor 
could not be found). Compared to Alex’s doctor, Groopman was unsure 
what was causing the bone-marrow failure and he advised the 
comparatively slow-paced course of action of culturing Alex’s bone-
marrow in the laboratory to see how it behaves.  
What stood out about Alex as a patient, for Groopman, was the difficulty of 
explaining to a physicist – a scientist who values certainty and intellectual 
understanding – that he could not be sure of what was the matter with his 
bone marrow. By comparison, Alex’s primary doctor was sure and did 
recommend specific (but drastic) treatment. Groopman and Alex’s primary 
doctor clashed bitterly, with the latter saying that Groopman’s 
indecisiveness would cause Alex’s death. The choice was Alex’s and his 
decision came down to which of the two doctors he trusted more. When 
Alex’s primary doctor said that Alex should not second-guess his advice 
and pointed to his own outstanding CV and accomplishments in the field of 
blood diseases as proof that he was to be trusted, Alex decided to follow 
the advice of the more cautious Groopman instead.  
Matters soon took a turn for the worse. Alex contracted pneumonia that 
landed him in hospital for a month and Groopman, still not sure of the 
diagnosis, continued with the marrow culture and prescribed a growth 
factor to encourage white blood cell growth – despite knowing that this 
could trigger leukemia. Slowly, Alex’s white cell counts improved and he 
began to recover. At the same time, Groopman’s cultures showed that 
Alex’s marrow was productive. This ruled out the primary doctor’s 
diagnosis, but did not itself reveal what was the matter. Months later Alex 
had recovered fully and to this day, Groopman does not know what Alex 
was suffering from. 
Groopman presents Alex’s case as one where intuition lead him to follow a certain 
route (the cautious one) in diagnosis and treatment. Groopman also holds that, in 
this case, he was lucky to have been right! This may be so, but the example also 
shows much practical wisdom at work in how Groopman had to balance the 
certainties and uncertainties involved in his own thinking (as well as that of the 
primary doctor) and had to weigh up the advantages of decisiveness and caution in 
this case. It is not simply the case that Groopman was the more ‘cautious’ and the 
primary doctor the more ‘decisive’ in this case. About the bone marrow transplant, 
Groopman was certainly more cautious than Alex’s doctor, but about administering 
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the growth treatment, Groopman was the more decisive (or risk-taking). Groopman 
also had to balance his uncertainty about what ailed Alex with enough confidence in 
his own judgement to over-rule Alex’s doctor and he showed much interpersonal skill 
in winning Alex’s trust – through honesty about the unknown and cautious optimism 
(rather than an appeal to technical expertise). What the case shows are the 
complexities – at once ethical and technical – that are at play in making judgements 
about what is best for an individual patient. The case also shows how clinical 
judgement is a case of weighing up different factors. The case shows that this 
weighing-up is not accomplished through a flash of insight or through an intuitive 
knowing what to do based on years of experience. Groopman describes his process 
of weighing up all the important factors as a process involving much careful thought 
– including theorising and experimenting with Alex’s bone marrow in his lab. As 
such, the case shows that figuring out what is best for the patient does involve what 
we call theoretical knowledge. 
However, the case also shows the relative importance of the demands of treatment 
and the demands of diagnosis. Recall that Alex was successfully treated despite the 
fact that Groopman could not reach a diagnosis of what ailed him. Intellectually, this 
feels unsatisfactory. Clearly, if Groopman could have diagnosed Alex’s problem, he 
would have been able to treat him more effectively; without a diagnosis, we also do 
not know what the future holds for Alex and whether the disease may strike again. 
Given a choice between treating Alex successfully and understanding what ails him, 
however, the sensible course of action was and still is to focus on effective 
treatment. It is not that either Groopman or the primary physician necessarily 
prioritised the second over the first, it is that the field of medicine is such that the 
quality of thought that it requires is being able to make the best decision for a patient. 
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The quality of thought that is needed is practical wisdom – the wisdom to achieve the 
right thing for that patient – and not discovering the mechanics of what was wrong 
with the patient – the wisdom of theory. Aristotle labelled this difference as the 
difference between phronesis and episteme; but, in contemporary language, we can 
say that the rationality of medicine is practical rationality rather than theoretical 
rationality. This is not to minimise the clinical advances due to biomedicine at all! It is 
only to hold that, while decisions made on behalf of patients draw on science, they 
are not identical with science. 
Groopman’s story spoke to us because it illustrates so well the difficulty of making 
decisions under conditions of uncertainty and because of the range of considerations 
that Groopman had to balance in helping Alex. As Montgomery shows in her work, 
narratives like these are standard fare in medicine: during clinical or teaching rounds 
or in the presentation of cases at conferences doctors routinely tell stories like these 
about individual patients. Because difficult clinical decisions cannot be captured in 
hard-and-fast rules or protocols, Montgomery holds that doctors have no option but 
to tell salutary stories like these to represent how difficult clinical decisions are made. 
In fact, it would not be an exaggeration to say that learning what it means to be 
‘practically wise’ will occur primarily in a communal setting where other doctors 
(seniors as well as colleagues) tell stories of decisions that they have made or have 
seen. MacIntyre (1981), for instance, holds that any practice (like medicine) is 
socially constituted and that good practice is essentially a matter of practicing in 
accord with the virtues that are admired by the community of practitioners. He writes: 
‘It belongs to the concept of a practice as I have outlined it… that its goods 
can only be achieved… in our relationship to other practitioners.’ (1981: 191) 
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In this relationship, the sharing of narratives plays a crucial part because, for 
MacIntyre, virtues are essentially explained narratively – by telling stories about how 
certain people and actions exemplify virtue (see above). Above, we already 
encountered MacIntyre’s concept of ‘practice based communities’ that define the 
virtues for their practice collectively.  In this context, the theoretical frame afforded by 
MacIntyres’s virtue ethics is considered to be very fruitful, because, for MacIntyre, 
the main way that new members are inducted into social practices is by way of the 
collective telling of stories about what makes for good practice in that community. 
Taking a MacIntyrean perspective helps explain the crucial role that narratives about 
good (or, sometimes, bad!) practice play in communities of practitioners: telling 
stories about good practice introduces new entrants to the tacit virtues and values 
that define the practice. 
7. A systematic study of narratives of phronesis in medicine 
While the growing literature on phronesis in medicine contains the telling of many 
stories like the one above, authors from the medical humanities (like Montgomery) 
have tended to collect and recount such stories opportunistically. Curious about 
exactly what are the stories told by doctors at various stages of their careers, we 
have designed a research project (Conroy et al 2016) to collect medical students’ 
and doctors’ narratives of phronesis in medical practice in the UK in a systematic 
way. We argue that virtues are understood narratively, and as such it is important to 
move the debate away from theory that describe examples of abstract or general 
features of phronetic decision, and instead examine examples of phronesis in action.  
 
In our study, “Phronesis and the Medical Community” (funded for 2015 – 18 by the 
Arts and Humanities Research Council) we will conduct interviews, observations 
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and use diary methods to collect narratives of wise decision-making from 120 
participating medical students and doctors. Participants will be taken from three 
medical schools and their associated hospitals in the West and East Midlands. 
These narratives will present interesting data to help us illustrate what phronesis 
means in current medical practice, to what extent it is possessed by practitioners 
and seen to be possessed at various stages of their career, and how it develops 
over time. 
 
Conroy et al. (2012) have shown how one can analyse the stories that health and 
social care professionals tell about decision-making in terms of ‘virtue continuums’. 
The method involves identifying all the different considerations that are in play in 
making a particular decision and showing how the wise decision in that situation is a 
matter of choosing (for each of those dimensions) a course of action between two 
extremes. Aristotle held that virtue lies in finding the mean between two opposite 
vices. Just so, our research will locate phronesis by identifying the different virtues 
that one must display in a difficult situation and finding the balance between them. 
For instance, in the example above, Groopman not only had to find the right mean 
concerning certainty and uncertainty, but also concerning honesty in his dealings 
Alex, courage in his dealings with the primary doctor, decisiveness (and no small 
degree of hope) in prescribing the growth factor, etc. Analysing phronesis narratives 
is a matter of identifying all of these dimensions and mapping them out.  
 
Having identified the narratives that doctors and medical students at our study sites 
tell, we will identify ten such fictional stories to feed back to the medical education 
community. The stories will be dramatized, performed and recorded as a series of 
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video-clips linked to an existing virtual community (UoC 2016) to show the narratively 
constructed progression of moral development from the contained environment of 
medical school to interactions with other professions, hospital boards, and the 
community in the form of patients’ family, patient representatives, pressure groups, 
press reports etc. These performances will serve as discussion and learning tools to 
aid in the teaching of medical ethics and professionalism. It is hoped that these 
dramatisations will illustrate for students and their educators not only the complexity 
of ethical decisions in medicine, acting as a moral debating resource but will serve 
as a potential source of narrative examples of wise and not so wise medical 
decisions in action during their education and future training.  
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